The fetish of geopolitics: reply to Gopal Balakrishnan by Teschke, Benno
new left review 69 may jun 2011 81
benno teschke
THE FETISH OF GEOPOLITICS
Reply to Gopal Balakrishnan
Gopal balakrishnan is one of the foremost experts in the Anglo-American world on the life and work of Carl Schmitt, and I am grateful for his response in nlr 68, ‘The Geopolitics of Separation’, to my essay on the thinker, ‘Decisions and 
Indecisions’, in nlr 67.1 Balakrishnan’s intellectual biography of 
Schmitt, The Enemy, remains, according to one eminent voice in the 
field, ‘the best English-language study’ on the subject.2 For a critical 
American scholar, the attraction of exploring and validating Schmitt as 
a radical and insightful critic of American imperialism and its liberal-
cosmopolitan apologists would seem unobjectionable. Schmitt deployed 
a remorseless and uncompromising vocabulary to dissect the crisis of 
the legal form in the inter-war period, analysing the pathologies of liberal 
international law and the relations between constitutionalism, democ-
racy and emergency powers, in order systematically to deconstruct the 
practice and ideology of the liberal-capitalist ‘zone of peace’—and with 
it, the incipient neutralization of inter-state relations.
Within this context, Balakrishnan not only regards Schmitt as a neces-
sary complement to Marx, but clearly as a superior analytical voice and 
point of reference in fully understanding the legal-political controversies 
and geopolitics that marked the crisis-ridden transition from the ius pub-
licum europaeum—the classical European inter-state order, regulated by 
international law—to an apparently de-politicized legal-moral universal-
ism, codified in the Versailles Peace Treaty and institutionalized in the 
League of Nations. Schmitt, Balakrishnan suggests, identified a politico-
jurisprudential problematic—and developed a corresponding categorial 
register—that Marx, in his own time, had never fully addressed or 
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conceptualized. The systematic exploration of this register constitutes 
the strength of Balakrishnan’s outstanding study.
Yet, given Balakrishnan’s Marxist credentials and background, the remit 
and objective of what is, after all, an intellectual portrait, remain curi-
ously restricted. The introduction to The Enemy frames his approach 
from the angle of a ‘diachronic contextualization’ and ‘intertextual recon-
struction’ of Schmitt’s work, resulting in a ‘provisional framework for 
the comprehensive and critical evaluation of his thought’. The first aim 
conveys the nature of the work better than the second. For this promise 
of critique—already toned down by Balakrishnan’s prefatory warning 
that ‘adopting the role of either prosecutor or defence attorney in dis-
cussing Schmitt’ presents a false choice—remains unfulfilled.3 Critique 
in The Enemy hardly ever reaches beyond occasional and rhetorical ref-
erences to Schmitt as a deeply disturbing figure. In the process, the 
study’s emphasis on textual exposition and reconstruction relegates any 
systematic critique of the intellectual architecture, analytical purchase 
and political legacy of Schmitt’s thought to the sidelines, rendering the 
work primarily a philological, exegetic and informational exercise—with 
greetings from Germany to the us. In fact, Schmittian categories now 
seem to form the strategic centre of Balakrishnan’s broader reflections 
on the grand contours of the post-Cold War international scene, encap-
sulated in the master-idea of neutralizations.4
More than a decade after The Enemy’s date of publication, such professed 
equidistance and equanimity, turning in the interim into embrace rather 
than critique, can no longer be afforded (if it ever could). The growing 
recognition and celebration of Schmitt in the wider social sciences 
and, specifically, in the field of International Relations, the actuality of 
1 Gopal Balakrishnan, ‘The Geopolitics of Separation: Response to Teschke’s 
“Decisions and Indecisions”’, nlr 68, March–April 2011; and Benno Teschke, 
‘Decisions and Indecisions: Political and Intellectual Receptions of Carl Schmitt’, 
nlr 67, January–February 2011. I would like to thank Frédérick Guillaume Dufour, 
Kees van der Pijl, Justin Rosenberg, Sam Knafo, Kamran Matin, Steffan Wyn-Jones 
and the members of the Sussex pm Research Group for comments.
2 Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt, London 
and New York 2000. Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise 
and Fall of International Law 1870–1960, Cambridge 2001, p. 423.
3 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, pp. 3, 1.
4 Balakrishnan, Antagonistics: Capitalism and Power in an Age of War, London and 
New York 2009, pp. iiv–xiv.
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Schmittian tropes in 21st-century American foreign-policy circles and 
the current contestation of dictatorial states of exception across the 
Middle East, from Tunisia and Egypt via Syria to Bahrain, have sharply 
re-politicized his significance, reception and legacy. 
Restating the argument
In this context, my intervention in nlr 67 was formally organized 
around five axes of inquiry. The first part provided an exposition of 
Schmitt’s grand historical-conceptual narrative of the ‘spatial revolutions’ 
that punctuate the history of international law and order, from the New 
World Discoveries to Hitler’s Großraumpolitik; followed by an outline 
of current neo-Schmittian attempts to comprehend an altered con-
temporary geopolitical constellation in comparable terms. The second 
section, drawing on Reinhard Mehring’s recent biography of Schmitt, 
set out a compressed diachronic contextualization of his intellectual 
and political trajectory.5 It concluded that Schmitt’s thought, far from 
constituting the ad hoc, disconnected and conjunctural interventions of 
an intellectual bricoleur and footloose adventurist, can be better under-
stood as revolving around an organic and consistent set of intellectual 
and political preoccupations, expressed in a recognizable problematic: 
the crisis of legal determinacy, the value of the state executive, German 
autonomy, political and geopolitical order in times of extremes. In face 
of these, Schmitt developed a series of ever more radicalized solutions: 
from his proto-decisionist writings of the late Kaiserreich and defence 
of the legality of Imperial Germany’s war during the 1920s, via the 
conception of the political in terms of the agonal friend–enemy binary 
in the late 1920s and advocacy of presidential emergency powers dur-
ing the crisis of the Weimar Republic (his definition of sovereignty), to 
the full-throated embrace of the ‘total state’, the Führer-principle and 
insistence on territorial conquests as the fons et origo of all international 
law, as the Wehrmacht marched towards Moscow. Though his natural 
intellectual maturation and political opportunism afforded conceptual 
adjustments and theoretical shifts that need to be registered, it is this 
underlying Leitmotiv—rather than any ‘unifying fascist logic’—that 
forms Schmitt’s basso continuo, which any de-totalization of his thought 
is likely to render invisible.
5 Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall, Eine Biographie, Munich 2009.
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The third and central part of my essay performed two tasks: first, it 
mounted an immanent critique of the gap between Schmitt’s core 
theoretical axioms—decisionism, concept of the political, concrete-
order-thinking, and their substantive analogues: state of emergency, 
friend–enemy distinction, nomos—and the historical narrative con-
structed on their premises, outlining deficiencies in both. It was my 
thesis that this triple axiomatic consistently suppressed social relations 
as a relevant category of analysis for the history of international law, 
while elevating the abstraction of antagonistic power, the fetish of the 
political (and geopolitical), to the neuralgic centre of Schmitt’s thought. 
This theoretical orientation is actively consonant with the political 
Schmitt as a counter-revolutionary étatist and, later, fascist thinker. 
Further—and against Schmitt’s own advice6—the section probed 
whether it was possible to extricate Schmitt’s conceptual apparatus as 
a generic analytic to illuminate past and present geopolitical transfor-
mations and configurations, as the neo-Schmittian literature seems to 
suggest, answering in the negative. The essay then examined Schmitt’s 
notion of Großraum, as the territorial unit for a new planetary region-
alism and the central juridical category of the Nazi ‘new international 
order’, along with his ex post attempts to sanitize this category’s political 
complicity with Hitler’s Großraumpolitik. 
The final section returned to Schmitt’s intellectual and political legacy, 
indicating—contra Mehring’s thesis of his role as a quantité négligeable 
in the Federal Republic of Germany and beyond—Schmitt’s profound 
impact within (West) German social sciences, his influential role in 
the American disciplines of politics and International Relations and, 
more specifically, in American neo-conservative thought, which pro-
vided the ideological backdrop to the foreign policy of the Bush ii 
presidency. Moral aversion was reserved for the epilogue; no aprior-
istic ideological condemnations should foreclose the analytical view 
on Schmitt’s thought. 
Case for the defence?
Balakrishnan’s response declines to engage with the formal com-
position of my essay, which delineated precisely ‘the relationship 
6 ‘All political concepts, images and terms have a polemical meaning. They are 
focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation.’ Carl Schmitt, 
The Concept of the Political [1927], Chicago 1996, p. 30.
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between theoretical assumptions, ideological limitations and political 
alignments’ that he demands. Instead, he couches his response in 
terms of an overriding and, ultimately, banal summary judgement: my 
intervention was tarnished by an ideological dismissal of Schmitt that 
blocked a careful unscrambling of what is alive and what is dead in 
his thought—a task that can only be performed by (yet another) sober 
diachronic contextualization and a critically informed interrogation of 
his entire oeuvre.
From this core message derive several relevant, but secondary charges: 
that I misrepresent Schmitt’s awareness of the socio-economic pre-
conditions of emergency powers; conflate Schmitt’s writings of the 
Weimar and Nazi periods; misread Schmitt’s wider history of inter-
national law and order; and overlook an inconvenient and possibly 
embarrassing similarity between Schmitt’s ‘fascist epic’ of the rise and 
fall of the ‘Westphalian System’ and my own interpretation of Europe’s 
long-term trajectory, leading to the objection that my conception of 
capitalist geopolitics—the alleged ‘geopolitics of separation’—looks 
one-dimensional compared to Schmitt’s ‘dialectical’ reading of the rela-
tion between geopolitics, statehood and capitalist development. The 
response concludes with a nonchalant dismissal of the significance of 
Schmitt’s influence on neo-conservative foreign policy, suggested to be 
in line with the structural continuity of America’s role in the world. 
Throughout his response, Balakrishnan attempts to diffuse my cri-
tique of Schmitt by composing a florilegium of citations gleaned from 
the ephemera of Schmitt’s writings, rather than directly confronting his 
central theoretical propositions, developed in the texts that dominate 
the Schmitt reception and discussion.
In the following, I will argue that any theoretical, rather than biographi-
cal, reading will disclose that a Schmittian sociology of sovereignty 
or emergency is a contradiction in terms. I will further clarify why 
Schmitt’s history of international law and order, especially as outlined 
in The Nomos, has to be understood in context-specific ideological terms, 
which render it deeply problematic on theoretical, logical and empirical 
grounds. By contrast, I will remind Balakrishnan how my own attempts 
to rethink this history from the angle of Political Marxism lead to a 
fundamentally different historical narrative, which Balakrishnan mis-
represents. Rather than implying that Schmitt and Marx can be read 
as mutually supplementary critics of liberalism and capitalism, I will 
86 nlr 69
suggest that the ontological, epistemological and theoretical premises of 
Marxism are diametrically opposed to Schmitt’s, forcing us to renew our 
efforts to rethink the history of geopolitics in genuinely Marxian terms. 
I will conclude by arguing that, rather than conceive of Schmitt’s theo-
retical apparatus as complementary to Marx’s, there is more evidence 
to suggest that Schmitt understood his own intellectual production in 
terms of an anti-Marx for his own times.7 
Sociology of the emergency?
According to Balakrishnan, my account ‘missed Schmitt’s many attempts 
to frame the problem of emergency powers in socio-political terms’.8 
Drawing a line from Schmitt’s recognition of the rise of the proletariat 
to the financial crisis of the Weimar state, set in train by the Versailles 
reparations, Balakrishnan implies a deep awareness on Schmitt’s part 
of the socio-economic determinants that produced the instrument of 
the state of emergency. But this is not tantamount to the much more 
demanding—and implausible—proposition that Schmitt articulated 
or understood his own history and theory of sovereignty in terms of a 
historical sociology of constitutional developments. Balakrishnan fails 
to distinguish between historical references and theoretical concepts. 
For no amount of localized commentary and exemplary illustration 
can validate the suggestion that Schmitt systematically incorporated 
the sociological as the strategic point of reference for a reformulated 
approach to the history of constitutional developments. Social relations 
remained theoretically exterior to, and systematically excluded from, 
his conception of sovereignty, as formalized in political decisionism. 
Sovereign is he who decides over the state of exception—‘an absolute 
decision created out of nothingness’.9 This definitional narrowing—in 
fact: erasure—of the net of determinations of the decision to an unmedi-
ated subjective act is the essence of Schmitt’s idea of sovereignty. Quis 
iudicabit? Who will decide?
7 Charge two—Balakrishnan’s suggestion (nlr 68, pp. 63–4) that I conflated 
Schmitt’s Weimar and Nazi writings—seems disingenuous: see ‘Decisions and 
Indecisions’, pp. 70–7. If there was one decisive theoretical caesura, but not a hia-
tus, in Schmitt’s writings, I would locate it in The Three Types of Juristic Thought 
(1934). Schmitt’s deep-seated and, at times, histrionic anti-Semitism is discussed 
in Raphael Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews: The ‘Jewish Question’, the Holocaust and 
German Legal Theory, Madison, wi 2007.
8 Balakrishnan, ‘Geopolitics of Separation’, p. 61.
9 Schmitt, Political Theology [1922], Cambridge, ma 1985, p. 66.
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Social forces do not enter Schmitt’s definition of the extra-normative 
declaration of the state of emergency, which remained analytically a 
supra-sociological, extra-constitutional (as well as ideologically anti-
social) device—a liminal concept—for the restoration of order. In this 
context, it should be recalled that Schmitt’s decision to define sover-
eignty in terms of the exception was not the result of a dispassionate 
and scholarly enquiry into the ultimate locus of power, but a politicized 
and normative intervention into the jurisprudential debates on the 
interpretation of the Weimar Constitution’s Article 48, on the scope of 
presidential emergency powers and executive government by decree. 
For Schmitt, sovereignty should reside in the authoritative decision, 
rendering it a non-relational concept, outside society and even outside 
politics—analogous to the miracle in theology. Balakrishnan surely 
knows that Schmitt explicitly related his notion of the exception to politi-
cal theology, rather than a historical sociology of public law. 
While Schmitt’s The Dictatorship advances a much richer history of state 
theory and constitutional law—from the classical Roman institution of 
the dictator to Weimar’s Article 48—than his Political Theology, social 
relations remain empirically acknowledged, but theoretically undi-
gested.10 Schmitt is not known or read as a theoretician of the inter-war 
economic downturn, revolutions and civil wars; and no neo-Schmittian 
writer, as far as I am aware, has actually reformulated Schmitt’s ultra-
narrow definition of the exception to develop a theoretical perspective on 
sovereignty that would enlarge its scope to incorporate the historicity of 
differential social relations of power. Schmitt developed a legal-political 
register, unsupported by sociological or political-economic analogues. 
This does not per se invalidate this register, but leaves it suspended in 
mid-air. Schmitt constructed legal-political concepts against the crisis of 
the Weimar state, rather than concepts of the crisis. That a historical 
sociology of the exception remains a distinct possibility—and an ongo-
ing research desideratum—from an alternative Marxist perspective can 
be learned from the writings of Schmitt’s disciples, Franz Neumann and 
Otto Kirchheimer, on the nexus between capitalist crisis, the dissolution of 
10 Schmitt, Die Diktatur: Von den Anfängen des Modernen Souveränitätsgedanken bis 
zum Proletarischen Klassenkampf [1921], 7th edn, Berlin 2006. For a brief statistical 
survey that relates the declaration of states of emergency to strikes and class conflict 
(rather than to martial law) see Mark Neocleous, ‘The Problem with Normality: 
Taking Exception to “Permanent Emergency”’, Alternatives, vol. 31, no. 2, 2006, 
pp. 191–213.
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the rule of law and the legal structure of Nazism.11 A distinctly Schmittian 
sociology of power remains, however, a contradiction in terms.
Towards a Marxist geopolitics
Balakrishnan further suggests that Schmitt’s work and my own share 
common theoretical orientations, as ‘what Schmitt wrote often seems 
to touch on the conceptual centre of [Teschke’s] Marxist understanding 
of modern statehood and geopolitics, which hinges on the historical 
process of the separation of the political from the economic, of coer-
cion from the conditions of surplus appropriation’.12 From this premise, 
three consecutive moves follow for Balakrishnan. First, that in my 
reading this separation, once established, ‘never becomes problem-
atic in the subsequent history of capitalism’—the alleged ‘geopolitics 
of separation’. In contrast, Schmitt’s reading of the multi-level crisis 
entailed by the collapse of the distinction between state and economy, 
or inter-state system and capitalist world-market, generated a much 
more ‘dialectical’ interpretation. Second, that Schmitt’s historiography 
of the rise and fall of the ‘Westphalian’ inter-state system, as set out in 
The Nomos of the Earth (1950), constitutes a similar, if in toto superior, 
narrative to my Myth of 1648; and, third, that Schmitt’s history demon-
strates greater affinities and parallels with Marx’s original categories 
than I would allow.
The point of departure of my wider work was to develop a research 
programme that would incorporate the problematic of geopolitics, 
theoretically and historically, into a revised Marxist framework. The rela-
tive absence of geopolitics in Marx’s and Engels’s own works, and the 
hitherto insufficient attempts to resolve this challenge from within the 
Marxist tradition, formed the reference point for my critique, informed 
by the premises of Political Marxism.13 The Myth of 1648 built on and 
further problematized the pathbreaking work by Robert Brenner, Ellen 
11 Wolfgang Luthard, ed., Von der Weimarer Republik zum Faschismus: Die Auflösung 
der Demokratischen Rechtsordnung, Frankfurt 1976; Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The 
Structure and Practice of National Socialism, New York 1944; William Scheuerman, 
Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law, 
Cambridge, ma 1994; Scheuerman, ed., The Rule of Law under Siege: Selected Essays 
of Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, Berkeley 1996.
12 Balakrishnan, ‘Geopolitics of Separation’, p. 62.
13 For a critical survey on Marxism and International Relations see Teschke, 
‘Marxism’, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds, The Oxford Handbook 
of International Relations, Oxford 2008, pp. 163–87.
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Wood and George Comninel on the class conflicts driving the transi-
tion towards agrarian-capitalist social property relations in late medieval 
and early modern England.14 One of its aims was to show how the con-
ceptual assumption of a differentiation between the economic and the 
political in capitalism translates into a historical account of the contested 
construction of a new form of English 17th-century sovereignty, culmi-
nating in the 1688 formula of ‘the King-in-Parliament’: a parliamentary, 
constitutional monarchy that institutionalized, though in non-linear 
ways, the formal separation between a public, de-personalized state 
and a privatized economic sphere. Post-1688 England also started to 
develop new foreign-policy techniques, encapsulated in ‘balancing’ 
within the context of a pre-capitalist and predominantly ‘absolutist’ 
European inter-state system. 
If capitalism is conceived not as a de-politicized and de-subjectified mar-
ket economy, governed by ‘economic laws’, but as a set of socio-politically 
contested social relations, the implications of its rise cannot be conceived 
in terms of abstract logical derivations, but demand a radical historiciza-
tion of its further, inter-state development. For the separation-argument 
is not conceived as an absolute, once-and-for-all insulation of spheres, 
but as an internal relation between states and markets whose degrees 
of de-politicization and re-politicization depend on historically concrete 
praxes. Capitalism is a relation of power. This also implies that capitalist 
social relations—once established in one country—do not automatically 
and transnationally replicate themselves across the components of the 
international system. The articulation of their international effects and 
implications requires a sharp move away from teleology, from a uni-
versalizing structural economism and a geopolitical functionalism; it 
demands a geopolitics as process, rather than superstructure.
These elementary ideas resulted in a novel research prospectus, explicitly 
opposed to the Communist Manifesto’s cosmopolitan universalism—
the expansion of a capitalist world-market as the mega-subject of 
14 Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International 
Relations, London and New York 2003. See also T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin, 
eds, The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in 
Pre-Industrial Europe, Cambridge 1985; Ellen Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: 
Renewing Historical Materialism, Cambridge 1995; George Comninel, Rethinking 
the French Revolution: Marxism and the Revisionist Challenge, London and New York 
1987. See also Heide Gerstenberger, Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the 
Bourgeois State [1990], Leiden 2007.
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world history; curiously echoed in Schmitt’s long-term prognostics 
of a ‘spaceless universalism’. The new geopolitical Marxism not only 
demands a re-politicization of capitalist development, as a contested 
and regionally differentiated institutionalization of social relations, but 
also a radical geopoliticization of its historical course, initially refracted 
through the drive of pre-capitalist ‘absolutist’ territorial polities towards 
‘geopolitical accumulation’. Contra Marx and Engels, The Myth of 1648 
argued that the expansion of capitalism was a political and, a fortiori, 
a geopolitical process, in which pre-capitalist ruling classes had to 
design counter-strategies of reproduction to defend their position in an 
international environment that put them at an economic and coercive 
disadvantage:
More often than not, it was heavy artillery that battered down pre-capitalist 
walls, and the construction and reconstruction of these walls required new 
state strategies of modernization. These . . . ranged from the intensification 
of domestic relations of exploitation and the build-up of an increasingly 
repressive state apparatus for military and fiscal mobilization, via ‘enlight-
ened’ policies of neo-mercantilism and imperialism, to the adoption of 
liberal economic policies.
While the initial impetus towards modernization and capitalist transfor-
mation was geopolitical, state responses to this pressure were refracted 
through respective class relations in national contexts, including class 
resistance. In this sense, the ‘alignment of the provinces’ generated 
nothing but national Sonderwege (special paths): 
If Britain showed its neighbours the image of their future, it did so in a 
highly distorted way. Conversely, Britain never developed a pristine culture 
of capitalism, since she was from the first dragged into an international 
environment that inflected her domestic politics and long-term develop-
ment. The distortions were mutual. The transposition of capitalism to the 
Continent and the rest of the world was riddled with social conflicts, civil 
and international wars, revolutions and counter-revolutions.15
This perspective prompted my ongoing reconceptualization of politi-
cal Marxism into geopolitical Marxism, to problematize the orthodox 
Marxist notion of bourgeois revolution.16 The historical substantia-
tion of these programmatic notes and the extension of the story of The 
15 Teschke, The Myth of 1648, pp. 265–6.
16 Teschke, ‘Bourgeois Revolution, State-Formation and the Absence of the 
International’, Historical Materialism, vol. 13, no. 2, 2005, pp. 21–2.
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Myth of 1648 into the nineteenth century and beyond are yet to come. 
However, the idea that, once established, two logics—the geopolitics 
of the inter-state system and the transnationalizing economics of a 
capitalist world-market—can travel unproblematically and in unison 
side by side is the exact opposite of my argument.17 Balakrishnan’s 
ascription of a ‘geopolitics of separation’ to my work thus represents a 
substantial misreading.
Aporias of concrete-order thought
Does Schmitt provide a geopolitics of non-separation, possibly even a 
dialectical one, which keeps geopolitics and geo-economics internally 
related? To ascertain this, Schmitt’s substantive writings on law and 
history would need to be re-anchored in the reformulated theoretical 
premises announced in his 1934 paradigm shift from decisionism to 
concrete-order-thinking. He first deployed this to replace the liberal 
and universalist idea of the rule of law—and its increasingly threat-
ened principles of generality and predictability—by a situation-bound 
de-formalization of law, upheld by and encased in different nationally 
homogeneous legal cultures.18 As Schmitt’s preoccupations moved from 
constitutional to international law during the mid-1930s, he realized 
that political decisionism was insufficient to capture the politics and 
geopolitics of land-appropriations and spatial revolution, which he now 
privileged as foundational, constitutive acts of world-ordering, so as to 
write the history of international law as an anti-liberal, anti-normative 
tract. The subsequent shift to concrete-order-thinking was meant to rem-
edy this explanatory vacuum. It is premised on a single and axiomatic 
thesis: that all legal orders are concrete, territorial orders, founded by an 
original, constitutive act of land-capture. This establishes a primary and 
radical title to land: a nomos—a unity of space, power and law.19
Given this turn to the ‘concrete’, how could Schmitt theoretically account 
for his otherwise perceptive remarks on the separation of the economic 
17 This argument is further developed in Teschke, ‘Debating “The Myth of 1648”: 
State-Formation, the Interstate System and the Rise of Capitalism—A Rejoinder’, 
International Politics, vol. 43, no. 5, 2006, pp. 531–73; and Teschke and Hannes 
Lacher, ‘The Many “Logics” of Capitalist Competition’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 565–80.
18 Schmitt, On the Three Types of Juristic Thought, Westport, ct 2004.
19 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Ius Publicum 
Europaeum, New York 2003, pp. 44–7.
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and political, the world market and inter-state system, which formed the 
historical condition of possibility for a transnationalizing us imperial-
ism, without negating his axiomatics? Even to begin to grasp this double 
separation, Schmitt had to have recourse to the Hegelian-Marxist figure 
of thought of the separation between society and the state, which he duly 
acknowledged in a footnote. Balakrishnan might be right that ‘the multi-
level crisis of this constitutive difference is, in fact, the central problem 
cutting across nearly all of Schmitt’s writings on the inter-war disorder’.20 
But Schmitt’s turn to international political economy imperilled the core 
of his geopolitical axiomatic: a retraction from concrete-order-thinking 
and a move towards a transnational economism, reserved for Anglo-
American liberal imperialism but bracketed for inter-war Germany. 
For Schmitt’s theoretical excursion into the field of international politi-
cal economy forced him to change theoretical registers—a volte face not 
licensed by his method of concrete-order-thinking. Where Schmitt exca-
vates the roots of the new universal order, he is pressed into an analysis 
of the international political economy of American rule—an analysis that 
contradicts his premise that every international legal order is grounded 
in an original and constitutive act of ‘land appropriation’. For Wilhelmine 
Germany was not invaded, occupied or annexed. Capitalism’s border-
cancelling tendency also cancels the core thesis of his fascist period. 
What ultimately emerges is less a dialectical reading of geopolitics and 
geo-economics, but rather the fetishization of a German formal empire 
against an informal us imperialism, insulated from any enquiry into the 
domestic political economy of fascist imperialism. The former arises 
like a deus ex machina from the purely political invocation of the friend–
enemy distinction to counter the abstract Western notion of a spaceless 
universalism with the German concrete-order, a fascist Großraum.21
A Nomos for Das Kapital?
Having suggested that my text ‘gives scant consideration to Schmitt’s 
Weimar writings, i.e. the texts for which he is best known and form 
the basis of almost all of the contemporary reception of his work’, 
Balakrishnan finally turns to Schmitt’s fascist literature, The Leviathan 
20 Balakrishnan, ‘Geopolitics of Separation’, p. 62.
21 For the policy-impact and widespread circulation of the terms Großraum and 
Großraumwirtschaft in 1933–45, see the documents collected in Reinhard Opitz, ed., 
Europastrategien des Deutschen Kapitals, 1900–1945, Cologne 1977, parts iii and iv.
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in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes (1938), Land and Sea (1942) and 
The Nomos of the Earth—the central text for the current Schmittophilia 
in the discipline of International Relations—while ignoring Schmitt’s 
Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung (1939): the intellectual blueprint for 
his conception of the new fascist ‘greater territorial order’. According 
to Balakrishnan, The Nomos was a piece of saturnine melancholia, 
written when the contours of German defeat in the East were already 
visible after Stalingrad. This is a misrepresentation of its conception 
and intention, though its execution had to square the divergence of 
unfolding historical reality with its core thesis: land-appropriations. 
Rather than a coda and lament—‘a conservative retrospect on the ori-
gins of an inter-state civilization that had arisen out of the fiery chaos 
of war and primitive appropriations’, which ‘now seemed to be return-
ing to it’, as Balakrishnan suggests—The Nomos was designed as the 
‘official’ celebration and justification of Hitler’s Großraumpolitik, which 
Schmitt reconnected with pre-liberal nomos-constituting acts of land-
appropriations, legitimizing both.22 What had come to an end was not 
the inter-state civilization of the ius publicum europaeum (terminated at 
Versailles, 1919), but rather the new Germanic vision of intra-regional 
law and order, revolving around a pluriverse of co-existing pan-regions, 
that was Schmitt’s counter-programme to liberal capitalism’s ‘spaceless 
universalism’. The Red Army had not only put an end to the Wehrmacht, 
it had also decapitated the cap-stone of The Nomos—the unfinished final 
chapter and the missing Conclusion—forcing it into an abrupt and 
speculative ending. This was evidenced by the absence of the three cor-
ollaries which were added to the 2003 English translation, written by 
Schmitt in the 1950s, from the German original.
Balakrishnan’s attempt to dissociate The Nomos, as a post-fascist after-
thought, from Schmitt’s pro-fascist writings is ultimately grounded in 
his inattention to concrete-order-thinking as the unifying theoretical per-
spective in Schmitt’s writings in and for the Third Reich.23 This unity of 
22 For the genesis of The Nomos see Peter Haggenmacher’s introduction to the 
French edition. Schmitt, Le Nomos de la Terre dans le Droit des Gens du Jus Publicum 
Europaeum, Paris 2001, pp. 1–44.
23 The concepts of Großraum and nomos were floated in 1928 and remained cen-
tral organizing terms thereafter. Carl Schmitt, ‘Völkerrechtliche Probleme im 
Rheingebiet’, in Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles, 1923–
1939 [1940], Berlin 1988, pp. 97–108. See also Schmitt, Staat, Großraum, Nomos: 
Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916–1969, ed. Günther Maschke, Berlin 1995.
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Schmitt’s Nazi texts, theoretically secured by The Three Types of Juristic 
Thought, is expressed in the trilogy of The Order of Greater Spaces, Land 
and Sea and The Nomos, each illuminating the idea of land-appropriations 
through a different register—the legal structure of Nazi inter-regional 
law, the geo-mythology of the elementary distinction between land and 
sea, and the history of international law from the New World Discoveries 
onwards. How could The Nomos of the Earth, written between 1942 and 
1945, and Land and Sea, published in 1942, not have been conceived 
as long historico-legal detours to accumulate the intellectual resources 
and arguments to legitimize Hitler’s Raumrevolution—a re-writing of 
history by one of the leading intellectuals of the ascendant Axis power? 
In a passage on the legal innovations and conceptual neologisms that 
accompany modern American imperialism, Schmitt notes that ‘he 
who has real power is also capable of determining concepts and words; 
Caesar dominus est supra grammaticam: Caesar is lord over grammar’.24 
A German legal-political counter-vocabulary was required to regain exis-
tential autonomy in the geopolitical struggle for survival. This was the 
task of Schmitt’s fascist writings on international law.
Land grabs
But ideological purpose need not nullify their message. Balakrishnan 
finds much to admire in The Nomos, detecting an analogy between 
Marx’s ‘account of the primitive accumulation of capital in great land 
grabs and colonial conquests’ and Schmitt’s account of the ‘Westphalian 
order’, premised on the division between the civilized denizens of the 
Old World and the uncivilized barbarians of the New. This opposition 
‘expressed a world-historical expropriation of non-European peoples and 
territories’. But this quasi-equation of the Marxist category of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ with Schmitt’s notion of ‘land appropriation’ leads astray, 
as the former depicts a qualitative transformation of social property rela-
tions, antithetical to a quantitative, territorial notion of land grabs. Not 
every form of conquest, booty and plunder can be vaguely associated 
with the idea of the dispossession of direct producers from their means 
of reproduction and their transformation into abstract labour. The 
Discoveries did not introduce capitalism to the New World; nor were the 
gains from plunder overseas, which greased the wheels of mercantile 
24 Schmitt, ‘Völkerrechtliche Formen des Modernen Imperialismus’, in Positionen 
und Begriffe, p. 202.
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and colonial commerce, of importance for the rise of capitalism in the 
Luso-Hispanic parts of Europe, or a sufficient precondition for the ori-
gins of agrarian capitalism in England.
Balakrishnan claims that ‘the nomos arising out of early-modern state-
formation and overseas conquests divided the world into two zones, with 
two laws of war and appropriation’, concurring with Schmitt’s account 
of the early-modern inter-state system, and the notion of ‘bracketed’ 
warfare within the civilized zone. But any closer reading of The Nomos 
shows that Schmitt was not only deeply ambivalent in his explanation 
of the European system—vacillating between the Conquista (1492), the 
rise of the Absolutist state (1648) and English balancing (1713) as the 
formative moment—but that he explicitly excluded the conquests of the 
Americas from the constitution of early-modern Europe. His discussion 
of the rationalization—jurisprudential and material—of the colonization 
process by Spain and Portugal reveals, paradoxically, that the Conquests 
did not precipitate the ‘spatial revolution’ and the subsequent rise of the 
new European inter-state nomos that he generically associated with the 
enclosure processes overseas. 
This is most clearly expressed in his differentiation between the rayas and 
the amity-lines. The first repartition of the oceans after the Discoveries in 
the form of the rayas (divisional lines) was laid down in the 1494 Treaty 
of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal, establishing a dividing line 
a hundred miles west of the Azores and Cape Verde: all the land west 
of the line should go to Spain; all the land east of it to Portugal.25 This 
meant the conditional territorialization of both the seas and the newly 
discovered lands, as required by feudal land-holding patterns and social-
property relations.26 The Americas, the Atlantic and the Pacific remained 
firmly within the reach of the late-medieval law-governed cosmos of the 
res publica Christiana, including the papal-missionary mandate and the 
just-war doctrine against non-Christians. ‘The later antithesis of firm 
land and free sea, decisive for spatial ordering in international law 
from 1713–1939, was completely foreign to these divisional lines’.27 All 
land and sea remained jurisprudentially ‘firm’. At least formally, the 
Vatican was still the central supra-territorial source of adjudication in 
25 Schmitt, Land and Sea, Washington, dc 1997, p. 41; Nomos of the Earth, pp. 88–9.
26 See Teschke, ‘Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and 
Theory’, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 2, 1998, pp. 325–58.
27 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 89.
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Catholic Europe. Against Schmitt’s express purpose—the centrality of 
land-appropriations for the constitution of the law-governed European 
inter-state civilization—he himself shows that this line was much more 
crooked than Balakrishnan assumes.
The quantum leap to the ius inter gentes is not precipitated by the 
Salamanca School, but by Dutch and English secular jurisprudence, 
notably Grotius and Selden, in the Spanish–Dutch/English debate on 
mare clausum versus mare liberum. The initial post-Conquest partition 
of the world between the Catholic powers along the rayas was only chal-
lenged by the Spanish–French Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) and 
the subsequent seventeenth-century Anglo-French and Anglo-Spanish 
treaties that fixed the amity-lines, dividing the world into a civilized—
law-governed—zone within these lines and an anarchic zone, a state 
of nature, ‘beyond the line’. This designated not only the land but also 
the sea ‘beyond the line’ as ‘free’ and lawless.28 Res nullius is also res 
omnium—up for grabs by the strongest taker. Schmitt therefore locates 
the decisive break from medieval-Christian to early-modern practices of 
spatial ordering not in the fact of the Discoveries per se, but in the tran-
sition from the Spanish–Portuguese rayas-system to the Anglo-centric 
amity-lines. This initiated America’s re-definition from an integrated 
appendix of the Euro-centric ‘Old World’ to a distinct ‘New World’ to be 
re-appropriated and divided in a morally neutral agonal contest accord-
ing to the law of the stronger.
Flaws of the Westphalian system
Of the famous ‘Westphalian peace treaties’, Schmitt hardly says any-
thing.29 Absolutism for him referred to a state strong enough to 
28 It should be understood that the arguments for mare liberum had nothing to do 
with free capitalist competition, as Schmitt obscured the distinction between ‘free’ 
and ‘open’ seas. The notion of ‘free sea’ simply referred to its non-law-governed sta-
tus and implied permanent military rivalry over the control of trading and shipping 
routes, as states tried unilaterally to territorialize the seas, rather than declaring them 
multilaterally ‘open’. Free trade across ‘open seas’ had to wait until the 19th century.
29 Three passing references can be found in Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 
145; ‘Raum und Großraum im Völkerrecht’ [1940], in Schmitt, Staat, Großraum, 
Nomos, p. 241; ‘Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für 
Raumfremde Mächte’, in Staat, Großraum, Nomos, p. 311. Throughout the course 
of The Nomos, Schmitt progressively shortens the duration of the ius publicum, 
describing it as lasting ‘for 400 years’, for ‘300 years’, and finally ‘for more than 
two centuries’. The Nomos of the Earth, pp. 49, 140, 181.
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de-politicize and neutralize civil wars domestically. Its historical achieve-
ment was to have carried through and institutionalized the separation 
between the private—the world of clashing ultimate validity-claims—
and the public, the sphere of a morally neutered raison d’État, whose 
overriding interest resided in the security of the state itself, the right to 
make war and peace. Since the Absolutist state was pre-representational 
or pre-parliamentarian, conceiving of itself as legibus solutus, it provided 
the ideal-type for Schmitt’s theory of the ‘modern state’, encapsulated in 
its decisionist nature, ‘absolved from law’. Correlatively, as the domestic 
sphere was rationalized, its international flipside led to the rationalization 
of inter-state conflict by means of a non-discriminatory concept of war. 
The rise of the ius publicum was premised on the concrete order of this 
state-centric spatio-political revolution.
I have already expressed my disagreement with this story. Balakrishnan is 
nevertheless right to suggest that casualty figures in early-modern wars do 
not by themselves discredit the category of bracketed warfare. That, how-
ever, was only one part of my argument. Since Schmitt articulates only a 
legal category, he is unable to decipher the social sources of the frequency, 
magnitude, intensity and duration of old-regime warfare, powered by the 
requirements of pre-capitalist geopolitical accumulation. Equally, military 
praxes render Schmitt’s claim of its civilized, rationalized and human-
ized character implausible, given the non-compliance with the nominal 
conventions of war (ius in bello), the customs of recruitment, the lack of a 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, and the problems 
of provisioning.30 It remains to be clarified how the notion of ‘limited war’ 
can be squared with the standard historical argument that old-regime 
‘permanent-war states’ succumbed to their military expenses, leading to 
fiscal crises, bankruptcies and state collapse. And I am still in search of 
an answer as to how Schmitt’s generic legal anti-positivism can be recon-
ciled with his celebration of the efficacy and civilizing mission of the ius 
publicum europaeum, while Absolutist states, according to Schmitt’s own 
reasoning, were simultaneously ‘absolved from law’—decisionist poli-
ties. The idea of non-discriminatory warfare regulated by the ius publicum 
remains a fiction, designed to promote the early-modern epoch as the 
paragon of civilized warfare against which the subsequent descent to the 
liberal era of ‘total war’ can only appear as a de-civilizing perversion.
30 Bernhard Kroener, ‘The Modern State and Military Society in the Eighteenth 
Century’, in Philippe Contamine, War and Competition between States, Oxford 
2000, pp. 195–220.
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Does Balakrishnan’s tentative endorsement of Schmitt’s protocols of 
land war and their alleged neutralization of the religious and civil wars 
stand up to historical scrutiny? Since early-modern states were not 
rationalized public apparatuses, but confessional dynastic-composite 
constructs claiming a sacralized form of sovereignty, public power was 
not de-theologized and neutralized. While the age of Absolutism did 
break with the trans-territorial theological absolutism of the Vatican, it 
simultaneously fragmented the unitary confessional papal claims and 
re-assembled them across the spectrum of a pluriverse of creedal mini-
absolutisms, after 1555 and again after 1648. The Westphalian formula, 
cuius regio, eius religio, did not endorse religious toleration for private sub-
jects, but sanctioned the right of regional rulers to determine and enforce 
the faith of the land. In the French case, the nascent Absolutist state did 
not simply guard over the de-politicized and neutral character of domes-
tic politics and religion, but actively established during the Reformation 
and the Wars of Religion (1562–98) its Catholic Absolutism in violent, 
directly politicized, century-long campaigns, culminating in the repres-
sion and expulsion of the Huguenots with the Revocation of the Edict 
of Nantes (1685). Absolutism did not rise above the warring civil parties, 
but repressed one of them, giving rise to mono-confessionalized, even 
sacralized states. Balakrishnan’s acceptance of the Schmittian idea that 
‘the separation of sovereign power from the promotion of partisan reli-
gious causes’ led to a ‘rationalization-neutralization of public order’ and, 
concomitantly, a religiously and morally neutered form of civilized war, 
remains within the Schmittian world. Schmitt’s whole account of the 
‘Westphalian system’ is deeply flawed, empirically and theoretically.
Balakrishnan concludes that my ‘historical sociology replicates the 
exact form of Schmitt’s fascist epic’, ‘underscoring the futility of [my] 
attempted demolition’.31 Setting aside the distinction between theoreti-
cally informed explanation and quasi-mythical narration—which seems 
to play a subordinate role in Balakrishnan’s view—this is not even mini-
mally true on a straightforward empirical level. As sketched, my account 
of the rise, nature and fall of the continental system of Old Regimes—
pre-modern, personalized, confessionalized, non-rationalized and 
constantly at war with each other—is diametrically opposed to Schmitt’s. 
We do converge, however, in the specificity of England. But where 
Schmitt senses intuitively Britain’s uniqueness, this is entirely reduced 
to geo-elemental categories.
31 Balakrishnan, ‘Geopolitics of Separation’, p. 11.
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England alone took the step from a medieval feudal and terrestrial exist-
ence to a purely maritime existence that balanced the whole terrestrial 
world . . . England thereby became the representative of the universal 
maritime sphere of a Eurocentric global order, the guardian of the other 
side of the ius publicum europaeum, the sovereign of the balance of land 
and sea—of an equilibrium comprising the spatially ordered thinking 
of international law.32
How was that possible? England ‘turned her collective existence sea-
wards and centred it on the sea element’, turning into a big fish—a 
leviathan.33 The problem with Schmitt’s ‘fascist epic’ is precisely that—it 
is fascist and it is an epic.
Reification of the geopolitical
Schmitt concludes The Nomos of the Earth—in its English edition—by 
returning to his opening philosophical question: what is the nomos? 
The Greek etymological derivation of the meaning of the term produces 
a tripartite distinction: to take, to divide, to pasture—appropriation, 
distribution, production (cultivation). It is their interrelation that struc-
tures any concrete historical nomos. The question for Schmitt is how 
they should be ordered: ‘Their sequence and evaluation have followed 
changes in historical situations and world history as a whole’, but ‘all 
known and famous appropriations in history, all great conquests—
wars and occupations, colonizations, migrations and discoveries—have 
evidenced the fundamental precedence of appropriation before distribu-
tion and production’, establishing radical title to land.34 Appropriation, 
whether vertical or horizontal, is timeless and primary. This held, 
Schmitt qualifies, until the Industrial Revolution. Thereafter, liberalism 
and socialism attempted to reverse this sequence by assigning primacy 
to production. Liberalism claimed to transcend appropriation by the 
promise of the production of plenty, constructing a utopia of production 
and consumption cruelly deflated by world history. Socialism grounded 
re-distribution in a revolutionary act of re-appropriation: the expropria-
tion of the appropriators at home and abroad.
Schmitt concludes that the horizontal relations of land-appropriations—
geopolitics—precede the vertical relations of production and 
32 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 173.
33 Schmitt, Land and Sea, p. 28. 
34 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, p. 327–8.
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distribution—political economy. In close syntactical analogy to Marx and 
Engels’s famous dictum that the history of all hitherto existing society 
is the history of class struggles, Schmitt argues that ‘world history is 
the history of the wars waged by maritime powers against land or con-
tinental powers, and by land powers against sea or maritime powers’.35 
History is conceived as a lateral field of geopolitical appropriations, un-
reconciled to the vertical dynamics of surplus appropriation. Schmitt’s 
international history is a deliberately anti-sociological project, seeking to 
validate the autonomy of political and geopolitical order over and against 
social conflicts and dislocations. Schmitt’s mythologically essentialized 
ontology overwhelms his historicism and regresses into the reification 
of geopolitics as such.
In the end, Schmitt failed to answer his own research-organizing ques-
tion: what processes drive land-appropriation—what establishes a 
nomos? The answer does not reside in a simple reversal of Schmitt’s 
sequence of appropriation, distribution and production, but in a hist-
orical examination of the politically constituted and contested property 
relations that generate differential constellations of authority, sover-
eignty and geopolitics. If the concluding section of The Nomos reveals 
Schmitt’s ulterior reference point and motivation, an anti-Marx for his 
times, then the future does not consist in a facile turning of the tables: 
an anti-Schmitt for our times. Rather, it forces us to meet the Schmittian 
challenge and to develop a theoretical programme that pursues a radical 
historicization and socialization of geopolitics—theoretically outside of, 
but empirically incorporating, that mega-abstraction of concrete-order-
thinking: ‘land-appropriation’.
35 Schmitt, Land and Sea, p. 5.
